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COMMENT
Empowering Voices: Working Toward a
Children's Right to Participatory Agency in
Their Courtroom Experience
KELSEY MARIE ELLEN TILLt
INTRODUCTION
Mia,' a 16-year-old precocious, smart, and self-assured young
woman, was in foster care due to her father's arrest (and later
conviction) of rape and child molestation of her older sister, Zoe. The
father had obtained custody of the two girls years before and their
mother was not in regular contact with them. After the father was
arrested and incarcerated without bond, the girls were placed in
foster care. There were suspicions that the father had also raped
Mia. She was bonded and attached to him and didn't believe he
should be in jail. The suspicion was that the father was having sex
with both girls and that, although Zoe ended up telling a teacher
what was going on, Mia was protective of him and didn't think that
he had done anything wrong.
t Publications Editor, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2016, SUNY Buffalo
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thank Professor Tara J. Melish for her assistance and guidance with writing this
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1. Names in this anecdote have been changed to protect confidentiality.
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Through her attorney, Mia requested visitation with her father in
prison. Although Mia had spoken informally during court hearings
previously, and was actually very articulate in doing so, she had
never been on the stand and subject to cross-examination. In essence,
she had never provided sworn testimony. As Mia's custodian, the
State was resistant to Mia visiting her father and opposed her
motion. The State subsequently called Mia as a witness and asked
direct, pointed questions about whether she had been raped by her
father. Assumptions were made about her ability to handle the
intense questions because of the confidence and intellect she had
demonstrated in previous hearings.
As it turned out, those assumptions were false. Yes, Mia was
confident and intelligent, but she was not emotionally equipped to
deal with the issues and questions she was forced to address in a
quasi-public forum. She made it through the hearing and completely
fell apart afterward. Mia had recently made it out of the Group
Home she so desperately wanted out of and into a foster family home.
She had seemed happy and bonded to her foster mother. They were
even discussing permanency. However, Mia moved in a downward
spiral after that hearing, refusing to let anyone close to her. She
pushed the foster mother away, she pushed everyone away. She
engaged in behavior that required police involvement and was
eventually placed back into a Group Home. Mia now says that she
wants to stay in a Group Home until she can go away to college; she
doesn't want a family anymore.2
Mia's story is just one of a vast number of child witness
cases, but in her story particularly, one can see how her lack
of agency deeply impacted her life in a negative way. She
wanted to visit her father, but her request was opposed. She
was called as a witness, even though she may not have
wanted to testify. She lacked preparation or advisement as to
what she could expect in the hearing. Further, Mia received
no additional assistance after she experienced trauma, from
mental health professionals or any others in what should be
a network of support. Most devastating is that the negative
consequences could have been avoided if Mia had a right to
participatory agency. Mia's personal interest in the case and
the fact that she might not be ready to handle the situation
were overshadowed by her attorney's insistence that she
testify. Although Mia initially seemed prepared, the attorney
focused narrowly on her past behavior in hearings. In
2. Email from Brooke N. Silverthorn, CWLS, Staff Attorney, Nat'l Assoc. of
Counsel for Children, to author (Jan. 7, 2015, 04:59 EST) (on file with author)
(anecdote slightly adjusted for style).
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circumstances like Mia's, what is essential is a legal
framework that focuses on the rights of children and
adolescents who testify. If Mia had voiced her needs and
desires and been treated as an active participant in this
proceeding, then the outcome could have been a positive one.
The number of child witness cases have dramatically
increased in the legal system over the past two decades.'
Factors such as "mandatory reporting laws. . ., more
education in the schools on crimes against children . . . , the
creation of specialized child abuse and child protection
teams, and better overall public awareness of crimes against
children" have led to that increase.4
While it is certainly encouraging to see this enhanced
awareness of child abuse and other crimes perpetrated
against children, the resulting upsurge of child witnesses in
a system they are not adequately prepared to face is
disheartening. The American legal system is an adversarial
system by design, and not crafted for children's needs.'
Children are at a disadvantage because they lack
understanding of the practices and procedures of the legal
system-even as teenagers their understanding is limited.'
Some examples of the potential disadvantages for children
are an accused's right to confront the accuser, and the
structure of cross-examination, which may include
hypothetical questions, compound questions, and double
negative questions.' All of these practices can affect
children's accuracy in presentation of their testimony.'
When children participate in any type of proceeding in
the American legal system (not just in criminal trials) they
are inherently at this disadvantage. A system that is
designed to elicit truth may actually subvert that truth.
3. SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, Child Witnesses in the Courtroom, in CHILDREN IN
THE COURTROOM: CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 121, 121 (2d ed. 2009).
4. Id.






Children may experience anxiety and trauma, which could
impede their voices and quell their adequate expression
while testifying. Although a number of practitioners,
theorists, and decision-makers may advocate for children
through the method of "shielding" children from the
courtroom, I propose instead a shift from third party
protection to first party agency for children and a children's
right to own their experience in the courtroom.
In Parts I and II, this Comment examines U.S. case law
and the dominant U.S. approaches to the difficulties child
witnesses face. I examine Confrontation Clause issues and
the developing case law implicating major changes to child
testimonial practices. In conjunction with these
developments is the response in state and federal legislatures
to child witness testimony and a number of suggestions for
how to alleviate trauma and stress for child witnesses. I will
therefore consider one- and two-way closed circuit television,
federal and state shielding statutes (and prosecutors' use of
these statutes), and courtroom procedures, which are all
efforts to protect children from the trauma of testifying in
court. Prosecutors' discretion in particular shows how the
system is not currently working to ensure children's rights.
These Parts assess the current legal framework in the United
States for protecting children in the courts. This
contemporary approach has unfortunately pinned children as
objects of the law, rather than empowered subjects, making
it so that the rights of children are not taken seriously.
In Part III, I suggest a shift from shielding children to
empowering children. This shift is absolutely necessary for
the improvement of child witnesses' experience in our legal
system. In this Part I examine the changing conceptions of
childhood and the development of the children's rights
movement, and how both altered perceptions of children and
the laws impacting them. I explore in depth the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), the
formation process of this international treaty, and the
relevant provisions that affect child witness testimony. The
United States has not ratified this treaty, and that certainly
stems from exceptionalism: the United States is eager to
criticize other states' approaches to children's rights, yet
hesitates to reflect on the deficiencies in its own practices.
The enforcement mechanisms in the CRC help to set
612 [Vol. 64
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indicators and benchmarks so that public officials are
responsible for looking at and implementing the principles of
the CRC and the rights of children into public policy. If the
United States ratifies this treaty or takes its principles into
consideration, it will be held accountable for how child
witnesses are treated and will be forced to think critically
about its own practices and develop ones that better conform
to CRC principles.
From there, in Part IV, I introduce insights from
international human rights law, providing examples of how
this shift from third party protection to first party agency
might occur by putting the CRC into practice. I propose that
in order to enact a change from third party protection to first
party agency for child witnesses, we need both a focal point
at the national level and a coordination mechanism to
integrate those rights into public policy. An effective focal
point could be a national Children's Rights Ombudsman, and
the coordination mechanisms could include a variety of
innovative preparatory and integrative approaches to child
witness testimony.
In Part IV.A, I introduce how the CRC has been
implemented around the world through children's rights
ombudsmen and how an ombudsman for children could serve
as a designated focal point, a last stop at accountability, for
child witnesses in the United States Although the United
States has not itself ratified the CRC-and need not do so to
implement the shift proposed here-the CRC offers an
important set of comparative best practices that the U.S.
justice system can and should learn from. In Part IV.B, I
focus on the innovative practices that seek to implement that
shift to participatory agency, including court schools,
specialized courts, child witness attorneys, and specialized
child advocates. Further, domestic courts can use the CRC
indirectly in their decisions, and grassroots organizations
have made use of the CRC through a bottom-up incorporation
strategy. I suggest that several of these approaches can and
should be ultimately merged into the court system itself to
streamline a children's right to participatory agency in their
relation to the legal system. While none of these methods are
posited as more effective than the others, or a perfect
solution, a combination of these tactics could work as a
2016] 613
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necessary companion piece to the Children's Rights
Ombudsman.
I conclude by advocating for a judicial system that
focuses more on the rights of children, through development
of preventative practices and concurrent approaches to
improve their testimony and foster their sense of
empowerment. This standpoint is where I think legal
advocates and other participants should seek to reposition
both the law and themselves. Rather than working against
children, the U.S. legal system should enhance children's
experience and provide them with the tools necessary to aid
in the overall administration and pursuit of justice.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE INCREASED
PREVALENCE OF CHILD TESTIMONY
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause has many
implications for child witness and child victim testimony in
the United States. The Clause states, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." Additionally,
children are presumed competent to testify under the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 0 Child witness testimony is particularly
important in criminal child abuse cases-when child
witnesses are purportedly victims of abuse, they are often the
only witnesses of the crimes, so their testimony is crucial."
The risk of testifying is that children can be exposed to
additional harm, and there is the danger that the children's
testimony could be used against innocent defendants if the
children were "coached or influenced by repeated and
suggestive questioning." 2 The challenge in child abuse cases
is to balance the competing interests of the "state's obligation
to protect the child" and the state's "obligation to preserve
the defendant's right to a fair trial."" As federal case law has
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
10. See FED. R. EVID. 601.
11. Janet Leach Richards, Protecting the Child Witness in Abuse Cases,
34 FAM. L.Q. 393, 393 (2000).
12. Id. at 393-94.
13. Id. at 394.
614 [Vol. 64
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developed, the implications for child testimony have been
manifold, and many early efforts at reform tended to focus on
the use of shielding in court. Shielding involves limiting the
juvenile witness's view of the defendant while the witness is
testifying (and, at times, the defendant's view of the
juvenile).14
In a seminal Supreme Court case, Coy v. Iowa, Iowa Code
Section 910A.14 was examined, as it established that
complaining witnesses were allowed to testify behind a
screen or via closed-circuit television ("CCTV").5 In this case,
a large screen was placed between two 13-year-old girls and
the appellant they were testifying against in a jury trial,
which resulted in the appellant's conviction of two counts of
lascivious acts with a child.'" The appellant argued that the
employment of the screen violated due process as the screen
"would make him appear guilty and thus erode the
presumption of innocence," and also interfered with his right
to face-to-face confrontation of his accusers under the
Confrontation Clause." The narrow issue here was whether
the appellant's right to confrontation was violated." The
Court found that it was and reversed judgment, remanding
the case.19 The Court reasoned that "confrontation is
essential to fairness."2 0 The State conversely argued that the
interest of confrontation was outweighed by "the necessity of
protecting victims of sexual abuse." 2' The Court declined to
consider whether exceptions to a face-to-face encounter
existed, but left that question open: "We leave for another
day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist.
Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy."22
14. See id. at 394-95.
15. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1014 (1988).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1015.
18. Id. at 1020.
19. Id. at 1022.
20. Id. at 1019.
21. Id. at 1020.
22. Id. at 1021.
2016] 615
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Regardless, the Court found that the Iowa statute was faulty
because it did not require an individualized finding that a
particular witness needed special protection from her alleged
abuser.23 But this case notably opened up the possibility of
exceptions to a witness's face-to-face encounter with a
defendant.
Maryland v. Craig was another pivotal case implicating
child witness testimony, particularly because it answered the
question that the Court in Coy reserved.24 A statutory
procedure in Maryland permitted a child witness who was
allegedly a child abuse victim to testify via one-way CCTV.2 5
Here, a six-year-old girl who attended the respondent's pre-
kindergarten and kindergarten center was allegedly abused
by the respondent.2 6 The trial court permitted three children
and the named victim to testify against the respondent from
one-way CCTV following the State's presentation of expert
testimony that these children would suffer "serious
emotional distress . . . such that [they could not] reasonably
communicate," if required to testify in the courtroom. 27 The
issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
Confrontation Clause "categorically prohibits" child
witnesses in child abuse cases from testifying at trial via one-
way CCTV, outside the physical presence of the defendant.2 8
The Court therefore considered the question that the Court
reserved in Coy v. Iowa, whether exceptions to face-to-face
confrontation are legal under the Confrontation Clause,
because the trial court found that each of the children
individually needed special protection.2 9 The Court followed
similar reasoning to the dissent in Coy v. Iowa30 : the elements
of confrontation include "physical presence, oath, cross-
examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of
23. Id.
24. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
25. Id. at 840.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 842-43 (internal quotations omitted).
28. Id. at 840.
29. Id. at 844-45.
30. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1025-30 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
616 [Vol. 64
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fact," and therefore face-to-face encounters are not always
required at trial." Also, hearsay cases support that
"confronted" does not mean face-to-face confrontation, and
therefore it is not an indispensable element. 32 The Court held
that the other elements of the confrontation right were
preserved in Maryland's statutory procedure and did not
subvert the Clause's purposes.3
The Craig Court declined to affirm the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of the Coy decision as requiring that (1) the
child witness is initially questioned in the defendant's
presence, and (2) a trial judge must determine that if a child
testified by two-way CCTV he or she would suffer "severe
emotional distress."3 4 Instead, the majority held that the
State's interest in protecting child victims of sex crimes was
a compelling one." Therefore,
if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state
interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying
in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to
testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face
confrontation with the defendant.3 6
Further, the finding of necessity must be case-specific,
necessary to protect the particular child witness's welfare,
and the emotional distress the child would suffer in the
defendant's presence must be "more than de minimus. . . ,
more than 'mere nervousness or excitement or some
reluctance to testify.""' The Maryland statutory procedure
that required that emotional distress must at least "impair
the child's ability to communicate . . ." met constitutional
31. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846-47.
32. Id. at 849.
33. Id. at 851-52.
34. Id. at 858-60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id. at 852.
36. Id. at 855.
37. Id. at 855-56 (quoting Wildermuth v. Maryland, 530 A.2d 275, 289
(Md. 1987)).
2016] 617
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standards.3 8 The Court further supported this holding by
stating that "where face-to-face confrontation causes
significant emotional distress in a child witness, there is
evidence that such confrontation would in fact disserve the
Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal."39  The
generalizability of Craig's holding, as interpreted by both
state legislatures and other actors, is addressed below.
II. PROBLEMS WITH, AND RESPONSES TO, SHIELDING STATUTES
The Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act40 was
passed by Congress in 1990 in direct response to Craig and
as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990, taking into account
the balancing of interests and requirements that Craig set
forth. 4 1 This statute established conditions under which
children could testify via CCTV, while laying out other
alternative methods of testifying and accommodations for
child witnesses.4 2
38. Id. at 857.
39. Id. Some questions raised in Craig remain unsolved. Andrea L. Dennis,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Neglect of Juvenile Shielding Statutes, 90 NEB.
L. REV. 341, 363 (2011). Some of the Court's reasoning seems grounded in social
science research and data that was not "robust" at the time-thus, if newer data
undermines those conclusions or if that data is discredited, does shielding still
hold? Id. It is also unclear how much de minimis trauma is required for shielding;
if shielding is available to traumatized children who are still capable of testifying;
if expert testimony is required to establish that trauma; what standard of proof
applies; and whether the Craig decision is generalizable to all kinds of juvenile
witnesses in any case, or if it is limited to young child victims entrenched in sex
abuse cases, like the children in Craig. Id. Child victims and witnesses have
arguably similar testimonial experiences in both sex and non-sex cases, and
Dennis argues that would "seem to call for equal access to shielding." Id. at 368.
Trial courts tend to broadly construe the class of witnesses who are eligible by
relying on statutory interpretation and inherent authority. Id. at 369.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2012).
41. United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 897-98 (6th Cir. 1998); see also
Richards, supra note 11, at 399.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3509; Moses, 137 F.3d at 897-98. This statute, like the holding
in Craig, is also ambiguous in its language, although federal courts tend to
embrace a broader interpretation of who may be shielded. Dennis, supra note 39,
at 370. Notably, the statute applies to child abuse victims and child witnesses of
crimes. Id. However, the scope of Craig's holding remains uncertain, and it is
difficult to predict who the Court will approve for shielding. See id. at 371.
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One way that the federal and state legislatures have
sought to ameliorate problems inherent in child witness
testimony is through the enactment of statutes such as
18 U.S.C. §3509 to codify the case law. In the 1980s and 90s
most shielding laws were enacted when there was an
abundance of media coverage of child sex abuse scandals, an
increase in child sex abuse cases that were reported, and
emerging research showing that children could be
traumatized in the presence of defendants.4 3
Shielding is one of a variety of tools that prosecutors have
available to assist child witnesses who are experiencing
emotional trauma while testifying, and "[t]he ability to
request shielding of at least some child witnesses is available
to prosecutors in virtually every jurisdiction."4 Prosecutors'
decisions not to use shielding statutes have possibly
frustrated the legislative aims behind shielding. 45 Four
factors for why prosecutors may choose not to utilize statutes
are: "namely, that shielding is (1) infeasible, (2) needless,
(3) ineffective, and (4) impermissible."4 6 In 1999, Gail
Goodman and several other researchers conducted a study of
prosecutors in these cases.47 The prosecutors are the ones who
make use of the statutes because of their responsibility to
make strategic litigation decisions, like whether to seek
43. Dennis, supra note 39, at 345. For their part, state statutes vary in whether
one- or two-way CCTVs are allowed; the degree of trauma that states must show
to allow child witnesses to testify out of the defendants' presence; the type of
offenses the statutes apply to (i.e. sexual abuse cases, a range of offenses, broadly
defined child abuse, or no limitation of the charged offense); the age of the
children protected (i.e. all minors; limited to under thirteen, twelve, or ten); the
use of testimony through contemporaneous or prerecorded video testimony;
closing the courtroom to the public; allowing leading questions on direct; the mode
of interrogation; providing for a representative or support person; providing for
multi-disciplinary teams ("lVIDTs"); authorizing or requiring courts to make
special accommodations, broadly or specifically stated; expediting proceedings; or
educating or training prosecuting attorneys. Richards, supra note 11, at 401-08.
44. Dennis, supra note 39, at 344-45.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id. at 346.
47. Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey,
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 255 (1999).
2016] 619
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approval for using shielding.4 8 In Goodman's study,
prosecutors "indicated that they rarely or never used
shielding measures." 49 The most common reasons prosecutors
gave for not utilizing these statutes was "lack of permission,
fear of defense challenges, and lack of resources." 0
The fact that prosecutors are not utilizing shielding
statutes, at times to their child clients' detriment and for
reasons contrary to their clients' welfare, demonstrates that
something in the system is broken and that this method
seeking to improve child witness experience is not adequate.
Children should have the right to meaningful participation
in these proceedings, and shielding statutes, regardless of
their goal, are not providing that agency to them. There are
48. Dennis, supra note 39, at 355.
49. Id.; Goodman et al., supra note 47, at 267-68.
50. Dennis, supra note 39, at 356; Goodman et al., supra note 47, at 274.
Although Dennis relies heavily on Goodman's study, the lack of resources
argument may be fading since Goodman's study was conducted in 1999, and
modern technology is becoming more accessible to a wider variety of people and
jurisdictions. But shielding may still be seen as needless. See Dennis, supra note
39, at 356-57. Because of prosecutors' caseloads, child victim-witness cases may
not be prioritized or the prosecutor may not receive many of these cases. Id. at
357-58. For that reason, these offices may not devote much energy or resources to
those prosecutions. Id. at 358. Additionally, if a jurisdiction has a high rate of
guilty pleas, shielding would only be used in cases that make it to trial, so the
need to use the measure would be eliminated. Id. The tactic of shielding may also
be perceived as ineffective, as prosecutors may be concerned with the possibility
of successful defense appeals if shielding is used. Id. at 359. Lastly, the primary
reason that prosecutors have indicated for not using shielding is that courts reject
their requests. Id. Interestingly, "[iun the case of child witness testimony,
Goodman's survey revealed that prosecutors would strategically decline to use
innovations that had the potential to hurt their cases, even if the measures might
benefit children." Id.; Goodman et al., supra note 47, at 272. Prosecutorial success,
from a prosecutor's perspective, may amount to case outcomes. Dennis, supra note
39, at 359. Thence prosecutors "will seldom seek shielding in the absence of clear
witness eligibility lest they expose a successful prosecution to reversal on appeal."
Id. at 371-72. This tactic can be viewed as a "risk-avoidance" measure. Id. at 373.
Even more complicated is the case of a child witness who was previously a victim.
E.g., Marx v. Texas, 987 S.W.2d 577, 578-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
Dennis, supra note 39, at 373. Furthermore, Craig has not been clarified or
refined, so state constitutional laws may interfere with the workability of
shielding, and the rationale of the Craig standard and a number of unsolved
issues as to its meaning could discourage prosecutors from using these
mechanisms. Dennis, supra note 39, at 360.
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better options for improving child witnesses' courtroom
experience beyond shielding. Additionally, federal and state
shielding statutes are subject to interpretation by the courts,
and interpretation may be varied and ill-conducive to
bettering the system for child witnesses.
After the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act
("CVCWRA") was enacted, a number of cases sought to
interpret its provisions. In the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
case United States v. Moses, the defendant was babysitting
his two nieces, two-and-a-half-year-old Amber, and four-
year-old Elizabeth, when, according to Elizabeth's testimony,
she walked past the room and saw him abusing Amber." The
defendant was convicted of sexual abuse.5 2 The district court
found that Elizabeth would be traumatized by testifying
because she was fearful, and ordered that she testify by
CCTV, finding that Section 3509(b)(1)(B) of the CVCWRA
was satisfied." Section 3509(b)(1)(B) states that a child
witness can testify by CCTV if she is fearful or mentally
impaired, would be traumatized by testifying in the
defendant's presence, or would not be able to testify due to
defense counsel's or defendant's conduct.5 4 The defendant in
Moses argued that the grandfather or Amber's mother's
boyfriend was the perpetrator, and that the district court was
erroneous in finding the requirements of the statute
satisfied."
The majority opinion in Moses discussed how after
Section 3509(b)(1)(B)(i) was passed, the Court of Appeals had
held in a number of cases that "a general fear of the
courtroom is insufficient." 6 There must be "a case-specific
finding that a child witness would suffer substantial fear or
trauma and be unable to testify or communicate reasonably
because of the physical presence of the defendant." 7 Here,
51. United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 896 (6th Cir. 1998).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2012).
55. Moses, 137 F.3d at 896-97.




Elizabeth's own testimony confirmed that she did not fear the
defendant; she did not want to see him, but she was not afraid
of him."8 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also held
that there was not a proper expert to establish that Elizabeth
would be traumatized from testifying in the defendant's
presence, as the expert did not have any knowledge or special
skill related to trauma.5 9 The Sixth Circuit discussed how the
expert's testimony only marginally supported Elizabeth's
fear of the defendant, with no finding of particularized fear
that the CVCWRA requires.6o The court held that the error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.6 1 Elizabeth's
testimony was ambiguous as to who the perpetrator was;
therefore, face-to-face confrontation was critical, and the
reliability of the defendant's confession, which the case then
relied upon, was questionable.6 2 The court found that the
district court mistakenly allowed Elizabeth to testify by
CCTV without meeting the criteria of Section 3509, and that
error was not harmless. 63 The defendant's conviction was
reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial."
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
child's fear of the defendant must be the "dominant reason"
that the child cannot testify in open court for the child to be
allowed to testify via alternative method (two-way CCTV)
under the CVCWRA. 65 The court was also concerned about
whether the two-way system could actually "capture the
essence of the face-to-face confrontation in some situations,"
and posed some logistical questions: how large the monitor
should be, where it should be placed, and where the camera
that is focusing on the defendant should be placed.66 Thus,
courts have wrestled with more refined meanings of the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 899-900.
60. Id. at 900.
61. Id. at 901.
62. Id. at 901-02.
63. Id. at 902.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2005).
66. Id. at 555.
622 [Vol. 64
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ambiguities inherent in both Craig and the CVCWRA,
Section 3509.
The Crawford v. Washington decision in 2004, moreover,
spurred even more child testimony because of its reduction of
admissible hearsay statements. The Court in Crawford held
that "testimonial" statements by witnesses at trial,6 7
regardless of admissibility, are barred unless the witness is
unavailable at trial and the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness before trial. 68 Therefore, the
reliability of evidence is not ensured under the Confrontation
Clause by determining that evidence is reliable and
trustworthy (as the Court in Craig reasoned), but solely
through a requirement that testimonial evidence is tested by
cross-examination. 6 After Crawford, more children had to
testify in court facing the defendant, as their statements to
therapists, forensic interviewers, or police could no longer be
introduced as evidence.7 0
The most recent development in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence is Ohio v. Clark; the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on March 2, 2015.' The case involved a three-
year-old boy, L.P., who when asked at school about bruises
on his face and who had hurt him, responded "Dee," meaning
his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark.72 The schoolteachers
informed the police about L.P.'s statement, Clark was
67. A number of cases have sought to define what "testimonial" means, and
what statements fit into the categories of testimonial/non-testimonial, but
generally they are 'statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52
(2004) (quoting Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No.
02-9410)).
68. Id. at 68; see also Dennis, supra note 39, at 376.
69. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
70. Casey Holder, Comment, All Dogs Go to Court: The Impact of Court Facility
Dogs as Comfort for Child Witnesses on a Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial,
50 Hous. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (2013).
71. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2173 (2015).
72. Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, How Courts Should Hear From
Children, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2015, at A19.
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charged with child abuse, and the case went to trial.73 L.P.
was deemed incompetent to serve as a witness, but the
teachers were allowed to testify about what L.P. had told
them.74 Clark was convicted.75 He then appealed, arguing that
his rights under the Confrontation Clause had been violated,
and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed. 6 The court held that
L.P.'s statement would not be admitted unless he actually
testified at the trial. 77
In oral arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court, the main
issue was whether L.P.'s statement was testimonial within
the meaning of the Confrontation Clause and therefore
whether it should have been let in at trial.78 The petitioner,
the State of Ohio, argued for the reversal of the Ohio
Supreme Court's ruling: the teachers were not acting as
police agents, but performing their duties as educators in
reporting child abuse and seeking to protect their students. 9
The argument from the petitioner was that this was not a
testimonial statement, as L.P. was a young child, the
question was posed to him in a classroom of students, and
therefore "his statements were not made to create
evidence.""
Ohio v. Clark was decided by the Supreme Court on June
18, 2015, and the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio's
ruling, holding that prosecutors were not barred from
introducing this statement when L.P. was unavailable for
cross-examination." The Court held that L.P.'s statement to




76. Ohio v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592, 600-01 (Ohio 2013); Friedman & Ceci, supra
note 72.
77. Clark, 999 N.E.2d at 600-01; Friedman & Ceci, supra note 72.
78. Cassandre Plantin, Ohio v. Clark, CRIMINAL LAw PRACTITIONER BLOG




81. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2173, 2177, 2183 (2015).
624 [Vol. 64
EMPOWERING VOICES
circumstances, it was not made for the primary purpose of
assisting the prosecution of Clark: it was sought by his
teachers to respond to an ongoing emergency and was made
in a situation that was "informal and spontaneous."8 2 Because
the Court ruled that the statement was not testimonial, there
is the possibility for a new hearsay exception (already
allowed in some states) that could ultimately apply at the
federal level, and this decision could have sweeping
implications for practitioners. 8
Beyond courts' attempts to make sense of these reform
efforts, Andrea Dennis has proposed the following three
reforms for juvenile shielding laws: "(1) expanding the group
of persons with standing to seek shielding at trial,
(2) narrowing the class of witnesses for whom shielding is
available through the creation of sharply defined eligibility
criteria, and (3) avoiding reliance on technology to effectuate
shielding."8 4 The first proposed reform specifically calls for
moving away from complete deference to prosecutors-
shielding laws should "authorize children to request
shielding," as well as "permit courts to raise the issues sua
sponte." 5 The second reform proposes that these laws should
expand to allow all juvenile witnesses in any kind of criminal
case to be eligible for shielding (a bright-line rule), but
counter-balance that with specific factors and strict
82. Id. at 2181.
83. See Plantin, supra note 78. One suggestion that the amicus curiae authors
provided for solving the problem inherent in Ohio v. Clark, when the case was at
the state level, was what they deemed a "creative, constitutionally appropriate
middle path." Friedman & Ceci, supra note 72. They suggested treating L.P., not
in the same way an adult witness would be treated, but in the vein of "non-human
sources of evidence." Id. Using the term "non-human" in this context is
troublesome, but essentially Friedman and Ceci argued that, under a prescribed
protocol, the court should allow Clark to choose a "qualified forensic examiner"
who would then interview L.P. to determine if there were grounds for questioning
his statement. Id. That way, the State could decide on the procedures to be used,
the critical evidence would not be lost, the accused could better explore
weaknesses in the child's account, and this process would avoid applying a
blanket approach to very young children's statements (tailoring it more to their
specific needs). Brief of Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (No. 13-1352).
84. Dennis, supra note 39, at 378-79.
85. Id. at 380-81.
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standards that courts apply when they consider these
shielding requests."6 "Low-cost" and "low-technology"
shielding, such as counseling, testimony prep, courtroom
visits, adult attendants, companion animals, alteration of the
courtroom's physical layout, use of a physical screen, or
relocation of people in the room, are all methods that exist
alongside modern technological shielding." In the third
proposed reform, statutes should allow for advanced and low-
technology shielding." If legislatures do mandate high-
technology shielding, then they should allocate funds for
courthouse renovation, hire the necessary people to operate
the technology, and purchase it as well. 9
The disparity of the state and federal statutes becomes
pronounced when prosecutors, along with judges and
attorneys, have to not only face the already challenging task
of weighing children's interests against the interests of
justice but "[t]he myriad of statutes that pertain to children
as witnesses, as victims, or as perpetrators." 0 Many
reformers propose the enactment of a uniform statute, the
ultimate goal of which is a uniform code of protections for
child witnesses that would be adopted by each of the states
and by Congress.9' One of these proposed statutes is the
Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods
86. Id. at 382.
87. Id. at 385.
88. Id. at 386.
89. Id.
90. Hon. Barbara Gilleran-Johnson & Timothy R. Evans, The Criminal
Courtroom: Is it Child Proof?, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 681, 682, 700-01 (1995) (calling
for a unified code in Illinois for child victims and witnesses, of both juvenile and
child welfare laws, and for additional legislation). Further, "while courts often
deal with the same parties and child witnesses in both civil and criminal
proceedings, courts must apply different statutes which result in contrasting
decisions." Id. at 682-83. The Honorable Gilleran-Johnson and Evans also point
out the role of the judge to "promote the welfare of children in the courtroom," and
how judges could carry out this responsibility more effectively if child welfare
laws were unified and consistent. Id. at 700.
91. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 11, at 417. Federal incentives could strongly
influence reform. Id. at 419. Richards' overall recommendation is more uniform
safeguards. Id. at 420.
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Act.92 This Act is an example of model legislation approved by
the ABA in 2002. Only four states have adopted it." The Act
provides that "[c]hild witness" means "an individual under
the age of [13] who has been or will be called to testify in a
proceeding."9 4 This age limit means that the recommended
maximum age is thirteen, but states can decide on the
maximum age in their jurisdiction.9 5 "Child witness" also
applies to both victims of crimes and witnesses of crimes,
even if children are not the victims. 96 The Act allows for
alternative methods in both criminal and civil cases." The
Act therefore acknowledges that children testifying in cases
of either physical or sexual abuse could very well experience
the same impact and risks of testifying in court. Further,
"other similar methods either currently employed or through
technology yet to be developed or recognized in the future"
are open to adoption.98
The Act also lays out the procedures for a determinative
hearing for deciding whether to authorize an alternative
method of testifying for children. 99 It provides that the
hearing can be initiated "upon the motion of a party, the child
92. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2002).
93. The states that have enacted the Act are New Mexico, Oklahoma, Nevada,
and Idaho, while Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, the District of Columbia, and
Connecticut have all introduced the Act. Legislation, UNIF. IAw COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/Legislation.aspx (Under the "Narrow Results By" search
bar, search for "Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act" under "Act
Title or Keywords," and search "All" under "State," "Bill Date," and "Status.") (last
visited Feb. 10, 2016).
94. UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALT. METHODS ACT § 2(2).
95. Id. § 2 cmt.
96. See id.
97. Id. §§ 2(1), 3.
98. Id. § 2 cmt. The Act therefore allows for future innovative alternative
methods.
99. Id. § 4. The standards for determining if child witnesses may testify by
alternative methods are by clear and convincing evidence if involving criminal
proceedings, and by a preponderance of the evidence if involving non-criminal
proceedings. Id. § 5. Section 5(a)(2) of the Act "comports with the essence of the




witness, an interested individual with sufficient connection
to the child to be a proper person to seek to protect the child's
best interests, or the presiding officer sua sponte, all as set
forth in Section 4(a)." 00 The Act additionally "does not
attempt to define the method or methods by which face-to-
face confrontation may be avoided." 0 '
In addition to the alternative methods provided for by
statute, the courts themselves have considerable discretion
regarding how the trial is managed, and can use
"unauthorized procedures to protect a child witness."l 02 There
are a number of ways that courts can assist children through
the actions of lawyers and judges who are willing and take
initiative.1 03 Steps can be taken by the judge to make the
courtroom itself less intimidating, such as a judge taking off
her robe; stepping down from the bench; limiting the number
of people in the courtroom; and allowing basic courtroom
modifications, such as "allowing the child to testify while
sitting at a child-sized table and chair." 04 Another specific
authority that the court has in certain cases is to bar the
public and the press from entering the courtroom. 0 Lawyers
100. Id. § 4 cmt. The Act therefore recognizes the agency of child witnesses in
permitting them to request a hearing for alternative testimony.
101. Id. § 5 cmt. Section 6 lays out six factors that the presiding officer must
consider when determining whether to allow children to testify by alternative
methods, as well as "any other relevant factor[s]." Id. § 6. The Act also expressly
provides for an issuance of an order that either allows or does not allow for
alternative method testimony. Id. § 7. The Act has a severability clause, so that
if a provision of the Act is held invalid, the rest of the provisions are not held
invalid and the Act can still be given effect. Id. § 10.
102. Richards, supra note 11, at 409. But judges' conduct will be "court error" if
it is perceived as partial to, or endorsing, child witnesses. Id. at 411. Also, if courts
explain why there is a need for special accommodations that could be deemed as
comments on witness credibility, that is in error as well. Id.
103. CARTER, supra note 3, at 123-24.
104. Id. at 125.
105. Richards, supra note 11, at 412. Courts should consider additional trauma
that children may be subjected to if the media is allowed in court, or if testimony
is televised. Id. at 413. See generally Karla G. Sanchez, Barring the Media From
the Courtroom in Child Abuse Cases: Who Should Prevail?, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 217
(1998) (suggesting that under certain circumstances the media should be barred
from the courtroom, especially when children are testifying in criminal cases or
[Vol. 64628
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can also reduce anxiety in child witnesses by preparing
children through a number of techniques. 0 6 Overall, legal
procedures can accommodate children's special needs by
having vertical prosecution or specialized units ("the same
prosecutor handles the case from the initial investigation to
disposition"); avoiding delays; scheduling testimony at better
times for children; providing frequent breaks; allowing
testimonial aids, comfort items, and parents in the
courtroom; closing the courtroom to the public and the press;
and providing for alternatives, both in court and out of court,
to face-to-face confrontation (through shielding). 0
Beyond alternative testifying methods that include
comfort items and support persons, companion animals like
dogs have been used in court for children who are testifying
as child abuse witnesses.'s0 Some may argue that regardless
of potential prejudices toward the defendant, use of court
facility dogs is a "logical step forward" because prejudices can
be mitigated, and dogs reduce children's re-experiencing of
trauma at trial.'09 Dogs may arguably even have less
prejudicial potential than support persons because they are
a more "neutral source of comfort" for children. 0 Dogs allow
child custody proceedings, and that children's testimony should never be
broadcast on television).
106. CARTER, supra note 3, at 126-27. The prosecuting attorney has the
authority to (1) prepare the witness, (2) conduct a practice interview on an
unrelated matter, (3) prepare age-appropriate questions, (4) request special
accommodations that are appropriate for the particular child, and (5) make
special arrangements for counseling. Richards, supra note 11, at 413-17.
107. CARTER, supra note 3, at 127-31.
108. Holder, supra note 70, at 1157-58. As of September 2012, seventeen states
allowed dogs into court. Id. at 1168-69. But no legislation expressly allowed dogs
as an alternative means of testifying (also as of 2012). Id. at 1175.
109. Id. at 1176-79. Defendants oppose the use of court facility dogs for a
number of reasons. See id. at 1169-74 (enumerating those reasons).
110. Id. at 1178. For a counterargument, see generally Abigayle L. Grimm,
Note, An Examination of Why Permitting Therapy Dogs to Assist Child-Victims
When Testifying During Criminal Trials Should Not Be Permitted, 16 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 263 (2013) (arguing that dogs should not be permitted into the
courtroom, and that they are unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause as
other alternative methods are less prejudicial).
2016] 629
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
for a face-to-face encounter with the defendant, which the
defendant may prefer."'
The problems associated with shielding statutes and
attempts to ameliorate those problems have an underlying
theme: inherent in the word "shield" is a focus on children's
vulnerability"2 and need for protection. What is vexing is not
the idea that protection from adults may benefit vulnerable
children, but that the law surrounding child witness and
child victim testimony is based on theories of protection,
rather than on inspiring and educating children, which
further perpetuates their vulnerability and ignorance in
their involvement with the legal system. Rather than
vigorously promoting the agency of children and their right
to have a voice in proceedings that affect them, United States
law chooses to subvert children's voices and shield their eyes.
While shielding statutes and other forms of "shielding" may
certainly benefit particular children who are testifying, there
should be an even greater emphasis and push toward
empowering children and enabling them to have some choice
in how they will positively interact with the American legal
system: "Although testifying is difficult for most children, the
difficulty should not be exaggerated. Children are strong and
resilient, and most of them cope with testifying and move on
with their lives. Indeed, with proper preparation and
support, some children are empowered by testifying."'I The
problem inherent in a model of protection and vulnerability
is that children do not have rights that are recognized and
111. Holder, supra note 70, at 1179.
112. It should be emphasized that there are two dominant meanings of
"vulnerability" in legal scholarship. The first comes from the literature on
"vulnerability theory," which focuses on state responsibility. Frank Rudy Cooper,
Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulnerability Theory, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1339,
1342, 1342-43 n.9 (2015). That theory purports that state actions must be
responsive to citizens and allow them all to actively participate in society on an
equal basis with others, taking into account vulnerabilities that we all have (but
not necessarily providing a mechanism for people's voices to be heard). See id. at
1342-44. The second is the use of the term in the context of international human
rights, where "vulnerability" means objectification: a lack of agency, where the
target population is marginalized. See, e.g., Jayne Huckerby, Feminism and
International Law in the Post - 9/11 Era, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 533, 584 (2016).
My meaning of "vulnerability" is the latter.
113. John E.B. Myers, Adjudication of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 4 FUTURE
CHILD. 84, 90 (1994).
630 [Vol. 64
EMPOWERING VOICES
can provide a balance between the constitutional rights of the
accused and the vague governmental interest in protecting
children that case law has provided. From here, I turn to
theory and frameworks in international law to demonstrate
the possibility of a shift from protecting children to
empowering them.
III. A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM THIRD PARTY PROTECTION TO
FIRST PARTY AGENCY: CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Historically, there has been a transformation from
regarding children as "mere objects of the law" to recognizing
them as human beings, with whom we can have a
relationship based on respect for their personhood: "In legal
terms this means that children are to be regarded as
individuals with fundamental human rights.""1 4 This shift
can be explained partially through the ways in which
attitudes toward children have changed over time: in the
West, until the end of the Middle Ages, there was a dominant
attitude of "indifference" toward children."' Because of high
infant mortality, children of about six or seven years old were
disregarded, and once children survived that period, they
were perceived as adults in some important ways." 6 In the
sixteenth century, however, "gradually children became a
114. EUGENE VERHELLEN, CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION, STRATEGIES, MAIN THEMES 7 (1st ed. 1994). Verhellen
defines childhood as a social construction. Id. at 9. I do recognize that there are a
multitude of ways childhood may be defined, and that Verhellen's argument is
limited to a "Western" legal and social analysis.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 10. At the age of seven, children were a part of the production process
and worked alongside their parents, or as apprentices, and became a part of the
larger community of adults (although children of nobility would not work, as their
parents did not work themselves). Id. at 11. Further, "[c]hildren participated fully
in all aspects of life: work - sexuality - life and death. There was no difference in
treatment between adults and children. In fact the apprentice system remained
in existence in the West until well into the 19th century." Id. Some of Verhellen's
sweeping generalizations, such as stating that there was "no difference in [the]
treatment between adults and children" I read with caution, but his general




separate group with separate characteristics, of whom specific
behaviour was expected."' 1 7 In the nineteenth century, the
conception of children as property items under the law
shifted, but not until the latter half of the twentieth century
did children receive legal personhood status."' Also in the
twentieth century, the human rights movement expanded to
include children's rights."l 9
The children's rights movement is in itself somewhat of
a paradox in its efforts to reject essentialist models of
childhood: that is, the children's rights movement must
embrace some notion of a universalized child and a
universalized concept of childhood to advance its cause.120
Regardless of this paradox, we can still reject conceptions of
childhood that place children in a subservient, passive
position of powerlessness, and embrace others that focus on
enabling children to act.121 The children's rights movement
realizes that children's right to self-determination and
recognition of children's autonomy are both vital, as well as
"the acknowledgment of their legal capacity." 2  Empowering
children may run counter to what our society, and the law,
currently practice: "At the moment it is common practice in
our society to remove children from situations which are
dangerous for them or in which their needs cannot be
satisfied, rather than to change the situations themselves or
117. Id. at 11. After childhood became its separate category, that category was
demarcated even more and differentiation between age groups further
categorized children: for example, adolescence is now perceived as a separate age
group. Id. at 12.
118. A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN 11 (1997); see also VERHELLEN, supra
note 114, at 13.
119. MOWER, supra note 118, at 11.
120. See Eric Heinze, The Universal Child?, in OF INNOCENCE AND AUTONOMY:
CHILDREN, SEX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 7 (Eric Heinze ed., 2000).
121. Verhellen views children as being placed in a "position of not yet being," as
they are "in limbo"-"not yet able to express themselves, not yet responsible . . . ."
VERHELLEN, supra note 114, at 14 (emphasis omitted). This position places them
in a relationship of dependence with adults. Id. at 15. But we must not regard
them as "unfinished products," as that is the human condition, not just a condition
of childhood. Id. at 18.
122. Id. at 23.
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provide the necessary means to satisfy their needs."'23
Although it may be imperative to an individual child's health
or safety to remove her from a situation, legal advocates and
policymakers should concentrate more on resolving those
situations and building children's capacities to cope with and
overcome them.
A fundamental reason that adults may be averse to
switching their focus to a children's right to autonomy is that
children are purportedly incompetent to make "well-founded
decisions."'2 4 They are arguably "not sufficiently mature
physically, intellectually and emotionally and they lack the
necessary experience" to act rationally in their own
interests.'2 5 However, adults may also lack emotional,
intellectual, and physical maturity, but are not denied this
basic right to self-determination. 2 6 There is a delicate
balance between respecting children's right to make their
own decisions, and "a need to override" (by mature,
responsible adults entrusted with their care) choices that
"would otherwise damage their lives."'2 7 While one may
acknowledge that children have a right to autonomous
decision-making, the extent of that right is what is at issue,
and "[i]t is argued that the law should be concerned with
nurturing ... child[ren]'s capacity for autonomous decision
making."'2 8 In cases when permitting children to make a final
decision could be inappropriate or damaging, one could
"ensure some consultation with ... child[ren] to improve the
overall decision making process. After all, the airing
of ... child[ren]'s views is good practice for more central
123. Id.
124. Id. at 25.
125. Id.
126. Regardless, there exists preoccupation with what children lack, rather
than what they can do. But "[c]hildhood is not incomplete adulthood. It is a set of
experiences neither more nor less internally coherent than those of adults."
Heinze, supra note 120, at 17.
127. TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAw 15 (2005).
128. Id. at 14.
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participation in decision making to be undertaken later in
adulthood."'29
Therefore, a solution to the search for a balance between
children's autonomous rights and their possible need for
protection is to steadily increase their involvement in
decision-making, while making certain that even very young
children have some degree of voice in decisions that will
impact them.'3 0 It is essential to recognize children's right to
self-determination "in order to make them more competent
and not the other way around: that their right to self-
determination be (gradually) recognised because (step by
step) they have gained more competence."31
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child'32 is an international treaty that aspires to transform
children from "passive 'object[s]' of measures of protection
to . . . active subject[s] of rights."' This treaty is remarkable
for many reasons: First, because of its "near global
ratification," and how quickly states signed and ratified it.13 4
129. Id.
130. One could view social policy that relates to children as on a spectrum
between "welfarist" and "rights-based" policy. Id. at 9. The welfarist view is "an
underlying policy aimed at protecting children who are seen as vulnerable
members of society in need of guidance and control." Id. The state, parents, social
services, and schools must "protect, nurture and provide fulfilling opportunities
for children's development." Id. In contrast, the "[r]ights-based policy is designed
to support children's own participation in decision making and is based on a
conception of children having distinct rights that can be asserted, morally and
legally." Id.
131. VERHELLEN, supra note 114, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
132. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Jan. 26, 1990,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC] (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
133. MOWER, supra note 118, at 4; see also BUCK, supra note 127, at 47;
Christine M. Szaj, The Right of the Child to be Heard, in THE U.N. CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY PROVISIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION 127, 140 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik &
Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006) (arguing specifically that Article 12 of the CRC has an
"overall effect" of moving "the child's status from a passive object of concern to an
active participant"). Article 12 will be discussed in length momentarily. See infra
pp. 637-39.
134. BUCK, supra note 127, at 47. In contrast to the expeditious signing and
ratification process, the drafting process was quite lengthy, largely because of the
vast variety of backgrounds of state participants included in that process. MOWER,
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It was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on November 20, 1989; states could sign the treaty
starting on January 26, 1990; and on September 2, 1990, the
CRC "entered into force."' Only four years after the CRC
became effective, in November of 1994, 167 states had
ratified the CRC. 3 6 The CRC is therefore "the first global
human rights treaty to be ratified by this many states in such
a short period."' A further remarkable aspect of the CRC is
that children are considered independent people: they have a
right to international law protection regardless of their
relationship to any other group or persons.'3 8 There are
currently 196 countries that are parties to the CRC,
including all members of the United Nations besides the
United States.3 9
supra note 118, at 15. NGOs had a substantial contribution: they produced
relevant comments and documents, as they had much "experience in dealing with
child-related issues and . . . first-hand knowledge of the status of the world's
children through their field work." Id. at 17. The drafting process's lengthy nature
was also beneficial because the "prolonged debate" over the CRC had the effect of
raising consciousness "as governments and citizens throughout the world were
made more aware of children's needs and interests." Id. at 18. These drawn-out
discussions "allowed more time to build support both for the convention itself"
and its "specific goals," perhaps another reason for the overwhelming support for
the CRC once time came for signatures. Id.
135. BUCK, supra note 127, at 49. Therefore, after only eight months of the CRC
opening for signature, it became effective. MOWER, supra note 118, at 14.
136. MOWER, supra note 118, at 15.
137. Id. at 14. There are two interpretations as to why the CRC was ratified so
quickly and by so many states. See id. at 14-15. First, states may have noted the
various loopholes in the treaty and recognized that their obligations under the
CRC could be "circumvented easily" if they wanted to do so and on the
international stage did not want to appear as indifferent to children. Id. at 14. A
more positive interpretation is that states sincerely wanted to see children's needs
and welfare "more adequately served," their basic rights protected, and children
"able to enjoy a higher quality of life." Id. at 15. One would hope the latter
explanation is correct, although in reality it is probably some mixture of the two.
138. Id. at 4. Also significant about the treaty is its consolidation of eighty texts
that directly or indirectly address the rights of the child, bringing them all
together in a single instrument. Id. at 6. The CRC is therefore an example of
globalization-"the worldwide convergence of normative legal standards." BUCK,
supra note 127, at 47.
139. Status of Treaties: Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtds
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The provisions of the CRC relevant to advocating for a
children's right to agency of their courtroom experience
include Articles 1, 12, and 42.140 The definition of children is
provided in Article 1: "a child means every human being
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."l 4 1 This
definition of the child is the "most widely accepted legal
definition of the child," which demonstrates the lack of
consensus on childhood, as eighteen is the stated age of
adulthood, but subject to states' legal definitions of adulthood
that may differ.1 42 Based on chronology, the definition could
be problematic, as it only makes one question why people
under age eighteen are significantly different.1 43 One could
argue that the existence of this treaty operates on the
assumption that people of this age are "sufficiently
distinctive to warrant a separate regime." 4 4 Therefore, the
paradox of the children's rights movement as discussed
above 45 is demonstrated in this particular human rights
treaty. However, there is a more likely explanation for why a
separate regime is necessary: it is really the social context
that creates the need for social and legal protection for
children. These separate, specialized treaties are necessary
because of the social stereotypes that place particular
individuals into categories: for example, people with
disabilities and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.1 46 Without these treaties that focus on rights for
g_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang-en (last updated Mar. 7, 2016, 5:00:46 EDT).
Somalia was the last U.N. member state that became a party to the treaty, on
October 1, 2015. Id. The implications of the United States' failure to ratify will be
discussed in greater length further on in this Part. See infra notes 181-95 and
accompanying text.
140. CRC, supra note 132, at 46, 48, 58.
141. Id. at 46.
142. CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 18
(2002).
143. Heinze, supra note 120, at 5.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
146. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature
Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 3, 2008).
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disadvantaged people, those people would not have access to
such rights. Hence why these special measures of protection
are imperative.
Article 12 of the CRC "reflects the general view of
children as rights-bearing individuals." 47 The first part
reads: "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable
of forming his or her own views the right to express those
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and
maturity of the child." 48 The term "freely" can be interpreted
as requiring States parties to ensure that the child who is
deemed "capable" has the right to "say as he or she pleases
without interference and to choose whether to express his or
her views or not"-thence, the freedom is a right to express
or not express, to voice or not voice.' 49 There was originally a
list of rights in this provision during the drafting process, but
the majority of delegations objected to limiting children's
expression of their views in a list: hence, the inclusion of the
phrase "all matters."' 0 The phrasing is "in all matters
affecting the child," not "all matters affecting the rights of the
child."'"' The implication here is that the right in Article 12
goes beyond matters that affect children "arising under a
specific rights provision of the CRC"-it has a more far-
reaching function, as it is not limited to rights stemming from
this treaty.5 2 But there is still an ambiguity in this provision:
How much of an impact is needed before Article 12(1) is
triggered, and considered a matter "affecting" children?'
Are those matters only those directly affecting children, or
are matters that indirectly impact children also
147. Szaj, supra note 133, at 127.
148. CRC, supra note 132, at 48.
149. SHARON DETRICK, Article 12: Respect for the views of the child, in A
COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
213, 221 (1999) (detailing the drafting history of Article 12 and the changes made
to its language).
150. Id.





implicated?l5 4 The last phrase of Article 12(1) means that
children who demonstrate their capabilities under this
provision not only have a right to express their views, but
also for their views to be "taken into consideration."'" But it
is not clear whether the state is obliged to provide children
with opportunities to express those views directly, or if the
requirement would be satisfied "as long as there is some
mechanism through which . . . child[ren]'s views are elicited"
in place.15 6 Age and maturity factors included in Article 12(1)
allow for individual judges and administrators to make
subjective considerations, therefore impacting how
efficacious this provision is in practice.
The second part of Article 12 reads: "For this purpose, the
child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings
affecting the child, either directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.""
"Administrative proceedings" could encompass a wide variety
of legal proceedings, including those involving care, and
divorce and custody.15 9 This provision could be deemed as
fundamental, as "it reflects a move away from merely
identifying what decisions children are not competent to
take, to the consideration of how children can participate." 60
But how children's views should impact proceedings'
outcomes (e.g. to what extent) is a question that remains.161
Further, the phrase "either directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body" provides some
154. Szaj, supra note 133, at 130.
155. DETRICK, supra note 149, at 222. The Committee on the Rights of the Child,
the enforcement body of the CRC, requires that States parties detail how they
have complied with this provision through incorporation into their national
legislation. Id. at 222-23.
156. Szaj, supra note 133, at 130.
157. Id.
158. CRC, supra note 132, at 48.
159. DETRICK, supra note 149, at 224.
160. BUCK, supra note 127, at 60.
161. Szaj, supra note 133, at 131.
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examples through which children's views can be heard.1 62 The
way this phrase is worded may indicate that children do not
necessarily have to have their own separate
representation.1 63 If representation is required, it is unclear
whether representatives would act as attorneys ad litem,
representing what children express their views and interests
to be, or as guardians ad litem, representing children's best
interests as determined by their representatives. 16 4
Adoption of the CRC, in particular Article 12, would not
necessarily give children a right to the ultimate decision of
issues that involve their interests, but the right created by
this provision "clearly opens the doors to participate in a
decision-making process."' The method of soliciting
children's views and what weight their views are given in
making decisions will establish the "true impact" of Article
12.166 The language of the CRC "makes clear that the authors
of this Convention envisioned a world where children have a
voice and where other people must listen," which can transfer
into a children's right to autonomy in the courtroom.'16
Article 42, together with Article 12, "describe the child as
a person to be made aware of his or her rights under
international law and enabled to assert these rights in
judicial and administrative proceedings affecting his or her
welfare and interests." 68 Children can also be prepared for
these proceedings, and they will then, as adults, have the
understanding and attitude to more effectively ensure
children's well-being.1 69 Article 42 reads: "States Parties
undertake to make the principles and provisions of the
Convention widely known, by appropriate and active means,
162. DETRICK, supra note 149, at 224.
163. Id.
164. Szaj, supra note 133, at 130.
165. Id. at 128.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 130.
168. MOWER, supra note 118, at 4.
169. Id. at 8.
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to adults and children alike."7 0 As many societies have not
viewed children as rights holders, the duties to publicize and
disseminate the CRC are imperative, as they can translate
into requiring "language translations for minority or
indigenous groups, and programmes of rights awareness
through mass media, professional training, school and other
educational curricula.""' NGOs and children themselves
have become involved in these advocacy campaigns."'
Perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the CRC is its
capacity to significantly impact its parties' domestic laws and
practices (pacta sunt servanda).7 3 Parties to the CRC assume
obligations under international law to implement the rights
of the Convention.17 4  Some countries have national
constitutions that incorporate international treaties into
their law of the land, and under this incorporation process,
courts of these states can cite to the rights in the CRC and
enforce them through domestic procedures."' Also, while
some may view the reporting procedures of the CRC as its
only "remedy,"l7 6 that is certainly not true. The reporting
procedures ensure that indicators and benchmarks are set up
so that states comply with the CRC's provisions, and make a
real effort to improve their laws and practices to more closely
align themselves with the purposes of the CRC.17 7 The
Committee on the Rights of the Child examines states'
progress of realizing their obligations under the CRC.7" The
reporting process is "deliberately aimed to encourage states
170. CRC, supra note 132, at 58.
171. BUCK, supra note 127, at 57.
172. Id.
173. MOWER, supra note 118, at 8.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 3, 8.
176. BUCK, supra note 127, at 49.
177. See CRC, supra note 132, at 59 (setting forth reporting provisions in Article
44).
178. BUCK, supra note 127, at 49. States' governments are expected to self-
monitor and evaluate, but independent monitoring, particularly by establishing
independent human rights institutions, is encouraged and rendered essential by
the Committee. Id. at 55.
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to comprehensively review all their child-related legislation
and policy. That process can engender new policy thinking
and initiatives."' 9 Therefore, both the potential of
incorporation and the push for innovation in policymaking
move states that have ratified the CRC toward domestic
policies and decisions that advance the rights set forth in the
CRC.s0 In implementing the rights of the CRC, public
officials assume the responsibility to look closely at these
rights and put them into practice in their own states.
The United States signed the CRC in 1995 but has not
transmitted it for ratification to the U.S. Senate.'"' The fact
that the United States has still not ratified the CRC is a
"significant weakness" because of its power and influence
throughout the world and because of its "active interest and
participation in the original drafting process."'8 2 The United
States needs to influence its own laws as well, and
ratification of the CRC would have a great impact on that.
The foreign policy of the United States has encouraged other
states to observe human rights, and this policy is most likely
more difficult to advance because of its "own delays in
179. Id. at 56.
180. Following the adoption of the CRC, the Economic and Social Council of the
U.N. set out a resolution focused on child victims' and child witnesses' rights. The
rights that it establishes, as related to child victims and child witnesses, are as
follows: the right to be treated with dignity and compassion, the right to be
protected from discrimination, the right to be informed, the right to be heard and
to express views and concerns, the right to effective assistance, the right to
privacy, the right to be protected from hardship during the justice process, the
right to safety, the right to reparation, and the right to special preventative
measures. Economic and Social Council Res. 2005/20 (July 22, 2005).
181. Status of Treaties: Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 139.
The act of signing a treaty is not without any legal effect, as "[s]uch a state is
bound not to do anything that would defeat the object and purpose of the relevant
treaty until the state has made its intention not to ratify clear." Id. at 49 n.1
(citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)). But other
scholars indicate that a country's signature alone does not have any legally
binding effect. HOWARD A. DAVIDSON ET AL., ESTABLISHING OMBUDSMAN PROGRAMS
FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 29 n.2 (1993). Regardless of its signature's effect, the
United States's failure to ratify the CRC is still an obstacle to the advancement
of children's rights.
182. BUCK, supra note 127, at 77-78.
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ratifying such instruments and in particular its complete
failure to ratify the CRC." 83 The reasons why the United
States has not ratified the CRC lie within structural and
constitutional complexities; for example, family law issues
are typically handled by state legislatures, not the federal
government, so people fear that ratifying the CRC would
federalize a legal area that has traditionally been under state
control.1 8 4 Therefore, objections may also stem from the issue
of how "children's rights" might infringe on "parental
rights,"' and, more likely than not, a feeling of
exceptionalism. Furthermore, ratification of human rights
treaties by the Senate has recently included a declaration
that the treaties' provisions are not "self-executing" and so
will not be automatically incorporated into domestic law.'8 "
It could be argued that the United States has already
"laid the foundation" for children's participation in matters
that affect them when they are witnesses or parties in court,
and their right to be heard, in particular situations, "has been
a part of our legal landscape for nearly [five] decades."'8 But
if the United States did ratify the CRC, Article 12 could have
a broad impact on U.S. law.'8 It is highly probable that many
existing laws would have to be modified to comply with
Article 12's mandates partly because of variance in federal
laws but mostly due to disparities between state laws.'89 The
main difference between Article 12 and law in the United
States is that the United States requires a "preliminary
finding of a source of a claimed interest or right," while
Article 12 refers more broadly to "all matters affecting the
child." 9 0 Therefore, a right to be heard in a proceeding would
183. Id. at 78.
184. Id. at 77.
185. Id. at 78.
186. Id. at 77. Ratification of a treaty by the United States under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, in principle (although not in
practice), should allow courts to cite to its provisions. Id.
187. Szaj, supra note 133, at 128, 132.
188. Id. at 140.
189. Id. at 129.
190. Id. at 133-34.
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not have to be conditioned on "the recognition of a particular
right originating in a constitution, statute, or the common
law.""' This difference could provide a real balance between
the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings and the
rights of children; the latter rights are currently not taken
seriously as they are merely a vague government interest in
protecting children. There is another reason why "Article 12
would provide for a more expansive opportunity for children
to be heard than currently is allowed by U.S. law."'9 2 The
right to be heard under Article 12 would apply to every
person under the age of eighteen who has the capabilities to
form her own views-so Article 12 "would serve as a catalyst
to reformulating current perceptions of children based on a
subjective assessment of their capacity, maturity,
vulnerability, or autonomy."' Furthermore, the right to be
heard under Article 12 and the appointment of a
representative would require that children have competent
representatives with them at proceedings to assist in
advocating based upon children's particular views.1 9 4
Guardians ad litem who express what they think are in
children's best interests are unlikely to satisfy this mandate
under Article 12, so the United States would need to adopt a
uniform code to outline the duties and responsibilities of
these representatives. 95
Children have criticized the lack of information available
to them in the judicial process; they should know before and
through the process "the manner in which their voices will be
heard."'9 6 Further, adults who are involved need to be
receptive to children's needs, "whether they wish to be heard,




195. Id. at 140-41.
196. Judy Cashmore & Patrick Parkinson, What Responsibility Do Courts Have
to Hear Children's Voices?, 15 INT'L J. CHILD. RTs. 43, 50-51, 55 (2007) (recounting
interviews with children involved in family law proceedings and their thoughts
on the option of speaking with a judge in chambers).
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and if so, how."' 97 Children's involvement entitles them to
knowledge about the judicial process and what their
expectations can be, as well as "some choice" regarding their
level and means of involvement." Both domestically and
internationally, there have been a variety of creative
responses to the call for children's greater role in judicial
proceedings that involve them, and their right to a say in how
their voices will factor into those decisions. Countries that
have ratified the CRC use that international treaty to
support their advancement of children's rights. Although the
ratification of the CRC by the United States would be a
significant step in the arena of children's rights, it need not
do so to improve upon and reflect on its methods. By looking
at how the CRC has been implemented in other countries,
and utilizing the principles inherent in the CRC, the United
States can have at hand a number of comparative best
practices, including state and local practices that embrace
the CRC's values, to improve the lives of child witnesses in
the United States.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE PARADIGM SHIFT THROUGH A FOCAL
POINT AND COORDINATION MECHANISM
For a paradigm shift from third-party protection to first-
party agency for child witnesses to actually occur, it would
behoove the United States to look to international and
domestic efforts that enforce the CRC or follow its principles.
It would be most effective to utilize that information through
an approach that includes both a focal point and a
coordination mechanism, the latter integrating the focal
point into public policy. A focal point that many states have
utilized and found successful is the children's rights
ombudsman, a set-up that holds children's interests at its
forefront, does not balance those interests against budgetary
constraints or other extraneous matters, and provides
children with a means to voice their concerns. The United
States should consider such a focal point to improve the
experiences of child witnesses. Additionally, there are a
number of coordination mechanisms that the United States




could use to integrate the ombudsman's work more directly
into public policy. These approaches are discussed below, and
include both preparatory and integrative approaches: kids'
courts, independent legal counsel, specialized child
advocates, specialized courts, a bottom-up incorporation
strategy, and domestic courts that apply the CRC indirectly.
A. Focal Point: Children's Rights Ombudsman
One response that provides children with more of a voice
is the children's rights ombudsman. Today, an ombudsman
is someone who is a "public watchdog" or "citizen defender." 19
An ombudsman is typically a government official who
attempts to improve systemic efficiency by reviewing
complaints of citizens.2 00 Ideally an ombudsman is viewed as
highly credible by the general public, a reputation procured
by maintaining a high level of "independence and autonomy"
and operating as an "independent voice for citizens within
the government."2 01 Ombudsman offices can exist at
municipal, county, provincial, and national levels-every
governmental level.2 02 An ombudsman can be created through
a number of methods-by the executive branch, a legislative
mandate, or through the citizens themselves.2 03 The
principles of an ombudsman include "unbiased treatment [of
citizens], fair decisions, and a confidential process."2 04
All national ombudsman offices were established after
1987, except in Norway, which houses the most well-known
199. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 181, at 8. This text provides an extensive
overview of the ABA's Child Welfare Ombudsman Project, which reviewed
thirteen programs established in ten other nations, see id. at 37-59, as well as
U.S. domestic programs, see id. at 61-87.
200. Id. at 8.
201. Id. at 8-9.
202. Id. at 9.
203. Id. at 16. For a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of each type
of ombudsman office formation, see id.
204. Id. at 12.
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children's ombudsman. 205  There are several major
distinctions between ombudsman programs in the United
States and those established outside of the United States;
these distinctions may be accounted for partially through the
fact that the CRC has been a large factor in setting
parameters for international children's ombudsman
programs.2 0 6 The United States has no national ombudsman
program that concentrates on children.2 07 Most of the U.S.
programs are created through an administrative directive,
executive order, or an act of state legislature, while most
programs outside of the United States are established by
national legislatures. 208 Programs of other nations focus
largely on "children's rights" concerns and use the CRC to
support their work, while only about half of the U.S.
programs described their role as educating the public about
children's rights. 20 9 The fact that "all ombudsman offices
outside the [United States] base their activities on the rights
of the child" stems from the "heightened national awareness"
of children's rights in countries that have ratified the CRC;
those countries use its standards to formulate government-
sponsored children's programs .210 Programs instituted
outside of the United States also make efforts to enable
children's participation in the democratic process by paying
attention to children's opinions.2 11 Further, the United States
typically uses direct intervention tactics, such as direct
advocacy for individual clients through litigation, while
ombudsman programs usually pressure authorities to take
205. Id. at 9. Norway's Commissioner for Children was founded in 1981. Id.
Offices similar to that of Norway's are located in Austria, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
New Zealand, and Sweden. Id.
206. See id. at 30. Due to the expansive language of CRC Article 45, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child can use information from ombudsman
programs' experiences to bolster its work. Id. at 36; see also CRC, supra note 132,
at 59-60.
207. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 181, at 91.
208. Id.
209. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




action by "providing information [to citizens] and indirectly
influencing public policy."2 12
A variety of international children's ombudsman
techniques exist for influencing public policy. 213 Materials are
published to inform public opinion, the media raise
awareness on children's issues, research studies are
conducted on matters of concern to children, "hot lines"
provide avenues for children to ask questions and express
their views, and children are given major roles at public
hearings.2 14 All of these techniques take more of a proactive
approach to ombudswork, as legislative reform stems from
other recognized sources on children's legal rights, in
particular the CRC.2 15 Ombudswork in the United States
takes a primarily reactive approach, as legislative
recommendations come from individual case work
experiences.216
An example of a children's ombudsman program is the
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children, which was created by
the Norwegian Parliament through the Commissioner for
Children's Act, and was the first national statutory initiative
for a children's ombudsman.2 17 It was meant to serve a
watchdog role for children's rights by monitoring the
Norwegian domestic situation and comparing that to the
international criteria of the CRC. 2 18 The Ombudsman for
Children has "free access to public and private institutions
for children" and has the right to information and records
212. Id. at 100-01.
213. Id. at 106.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 120.
216. Id. Davidson et al. discuss how legislative recommendations often come
from these experienced case workers, which can be seen as pro-active. In my view,
however, the fact that these recommendations come after these case workers have
seen so many cases demonstrates the need for the United States to take action
earlier on when issues arise.
217. MALFRID GRUDE FLEKKOY, WORKING FOR THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: THE
EXPERIENCE OF THE NORWEGIAN OMBUDSMAN FOR CHILDREN 1-4 (1990).
218. Id. at 1.
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even if that information is typically confidential.2 19 The
Ombudsman does not have decision-making power and
cannot revoke other authorities' decisions; therefore, the
principal means of advocacy for the Ombudsman is through
disseminating information and documenting case
presentations.2 2 0 When the Commissioner makes a statement
on a case, she decides toward whom it is directed, such as the
press or a broadcasting corporation; she may criticize the
legal or factual situation of a case but may not present an
opinion about the law when the case has been decided by or
is brought before the courts. 22 1 An annual Commissioner's
report is made available to the public. The position is a four-
year appointment, no longer than eight years total, and the
Commissioner works with an Advisory Panel that is solely an
advisory body with no decision-making power.22 2
The cases that the Commissioner takes up are by her
"own initiative" or through the "request of other people."22 3
Many of the cases can be solved through providing
straightforward information, and some cases are declined or
referred elsewhere for handling.224 If a case involves an issue
of general concern, the Ombudsman may more
comprehensively handle it through statements made to
national or local administration or proposals for modifying
existing regulations or legislation. 225 The complaints and
requests that come from children provide "inside"
219. Id. at 5.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 6. The Commissioner cannot take a case without the permission of
the child who is the subject of the application-either the relevant child must
have been the one who submitted an application to the Commissioner on her own
behalf or the relevant child must have indicated approval for the Commissioner
to take the case. Id. After the child gives this approval the guardian's permission
should also be sought if the child is of a younger age. See id. Even if the child is
young, the Commissioner may deal with the case without the child's guardian's
permission, as long as she obtains the child's consent and general considerations
show that the guardian's permission is not necessary. See id.




information into the life of children in Norway.2 2 6 These
complaints are more "wide-ranging" and differ from adults'
complaints, and they show that children are aware of, and
capable of effectively expressing, their concerns. 227 Further,
"[c]hildren are also effective in following up: given a place to
go with their complaint and some minimal support and
information, even young children can and will do a lot on
their own behalf. Children also call back to report on their
results, which adults rarely bother to do."2 28 When the cases
come through the Commissioner, the action that is taken is
either providing information, making a public statement, or
proposing change; if one of the latter two actions is chosen,
the Ombudsman office may support other initiatives rather
than initiating support itself.2 2 9
One of the most important aspects of the office is the fact
that its establishment signifies "official recognition" by
Parliament of the "need for child advocacy."2 3 0 Parliament
cannot make decisions for the Ombudsman, however, and
only the Ombudsman decides how she carries out her
responsibilities. 23 1 The legislative obligation to criticize
means that "the Ombudsman can raise issues that
others .. . are not in a position to raise" because of political
loyalties or parental status.2 3 2 Also, because the Ombudsman
can "handle any case or problem in any way," she can issue
opinions or statements regardless of any political consent.2 3 3
The release from confidentiality provided by the position
gives the Ombudsman the right to relieve others of their
confidentiality oaths and the right to protect sources of
226. Id. at 12.
227. Id.
228. Id. Although most of the children who rendered complaints were from the
age bracket of 7-15, there were a few 3-4 year-olds who contacted the
Ombudsman. Id.
229. Id. at 12-13.
230. Id. at 21. Parliament also provides the office's annual budget. Id.
231. Id. The Act outlines how the Ombudsman can carry out her
responsibilities. Id. at 4, 21.
232. Id. at 21.
233. Id. at 22.
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information.2 3 4 Perhaps the most important aspect of the
Norwegian Ombudsman for Children is the "[s]upremacy of
children's interests."23 5 As the Ombudsman is both financially
and legally independent, she cannot be suspected of serving
a purpose other than to advance the rights of children.236 She
does not have to balance children's interests against
potentially conflicting interests, or defend her budgetary
expenditures spent on varying social interests.2 3 7
Howard Davidson has set out several strategies to
promote ombudswork in the United States. The United
States could use existing federal laws that relate to the
delivery and supervision of services to youth and children at
local and state levels as a vehicle for creating and supporting
ombudsman programs for children and youth; Congress could
add an ombudswork section to any of these existing or
proposed federal laws.2 38 Alternatively, the legislature could
create an act focusing specifically on children's ombudswork
to fuel children's ombudsman programs and "stimulate state
development of relevant programs."23 9 The United States
could create a children's rights ombudsman or even an
ombudsman that tackles child witness and child victim
issues specifically. The United States could also aim for a
more proactive approach to ombudswork by initiating
techniques that internationally have impacted children's
rights-through media, hot lines, public hearings, and
research. These initiatives would all help shift the focus from
third-party protection to first-party agency so that child
witnesses and victims could have a much stronger voice in if
or how they testify in court. These initiatives could also raise
concerns for stronger preparation programs.
The United States could benefit from looking at
children's ombudsman programs internationally, like that of





238. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 181, at 121.
239. Id. at 122.
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about what aspects of the programs work and do not work
and to learn how to improve ombudsman programs
domestically.2 40 The ultimate goal would be to create a
national Children's Ombudsman, a focal point for efforts to
improve child witnesses' experiences in the courtroom and
other hearings that deeply affect them.
B. Coordination Mechanisms: Preparatory and Integrative
Approaches
Other mechanisms that shift focus to first-party agency
for children who are testifying could be used to coordinate
domestic ombudswork. These other tactics include court
schools, specialized courts, and attorneys for children, some
of which can be found domestically. These are all
mechanisms that integrate child witness rights in public
policy and would work alongside the Children's Rights
Ombudsman.
1. Preparatory approaches
One approach to empower children who are testifying is
to focus more on the preparation of children for court; such
an approach includes an "empowerment (versus
protectionist) model" of advocating for child witnesses that
simultaneously does not compromise interests of the
defense.2 4 1 Children may fear testifying if they "are not
adequately prepared" because they have a "very limited
understanding of the court system, its participants and
conventions."2 42 Reforming the pre-trial process rather than
240. In 1993, the ABA reviewed ten nations' children's ombudswork programs:
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Guatemala, Israel, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 37. The CRC has "played an important
role in . .. acceptance" of the idea of a children's ombudsman and children's
ombudswork in these foreign countries, and therefore the activities in these
countries have a "decidedly child rights focus." Id. at 39. For an overview of these
programs, see id. at 40-59.
241. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to
Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 927,
972 (1993) (examining the importance of reforming the pre-trial process).
242. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System
Should Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 307,
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"focusing on trial reform" would certainly help our nation
tackle the problems associated with children involved in the
court system; it would also allow these children to more
effectively voice their concerns and views.24 3
Innovative programs have been developed by several
jurisdictions to assist children in the court process. 24 4 "Court
schools" are programs for children who will be testifying and
exist in a "number of communities."2 45 "Classes" are held in
which children learn about court, and role-playing may be
used so that children can practice testifying about events
that are unrelated to their abuse or their specific case.2 46 The
benefit of these programs is that they increase children's
confidence and eradicate their fear of court, or "the
unknown."2 4 7 One specific example of a court school is the
Kids' Court School ("KCS") at the William S. Boyd School of
Law of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.2 48 KCS "court
educators"-law students and dual-degree students-use "an
evidence-based curriculum" to teach children aged four to
seventeen "who [are] scheduled to appear in court in any
capacity," and "there is no charge for participati[ng] ."249 The
students could be youth charged with a crime, witnesses, or
323-34 (1999) (advocating for preparation of children for testifying through model
programs and an attorney-client model rather than a guardian ad litem model).
243. Montoya, supra note 241, at 987.
244. For a review of some model programs that aim to reduce child trauma in
court, see Debra Jenkins, Reducing Trauma for Children Involved in Dependency
and Criminal Court, 27 CHILD L. PRAc. 1 (2008) (detailing forms of court-related
trauma children may experience, practitioners' roles in alleviating and
preventing that trauma, and other collaborative strategies to support and prepare
children for testifying).
245. Myers, supra note 113, at 90.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Anne R. Traum, Empowering Kids in the Courtroom at UNLV's Kids' Court
School, 22 NEV. LAw. 40, 40 (2014); see also Dawn Hathaway Thoman, Testifying
Minors: Pre-Trial Strategies to Reduce Anxiety in Child Witnesses, 14 NEV. L.J.
236, 247-48 (2013) (detailing how anxiety breeds harm in child witnesses and
providing strategies for reducing that anxiety).
249. Traum, supra note 248, at 41; Kids' Court School, UNLV,
http://www.law.unlv.edulkids-court (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
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victims.25 0 The curriculum consists of two one-hour long
sessions. Session one centers on processes before and during
trial by taking the children through "the roles and functions
of courtroom participants"; students also learn about
communication techniques, such as the ability to pose
clarifying questions and "the importance of telling the
truth."2 5 ' Session two includes "stress inoculation training,"
using "coping skills to reduce anxiety," such as "breathing
techniques and positive self-talk."2 52 The second session
concludes with a summary of the ideas and concepts the
children have learned and closes with a mock trial in the
courtroom at the law school; individual cases are not
discussed.25 3 Over 865 children and youth who are involved
in judicial proceedings have participated in KCS, and these
participants have been significantly less anxious about court
appearances and testifying due to reduction of their "court-
related stress" through this program.25 4 The KCS program
has received national recognition by Harvard University as a
model program for courtroom education of children.25 5
Children do not have to be subpoenaed by a court in order to
participate,25 6 but some Nevada judges require child
witnesses to attend KCS before testifying.2 5 7 Court education
programs like KCS continue to burgeon throughout the
country, and several county governments have found these
programs valuable enough to fund.2 58
Another way to ensure that children have a voice is
through "representation and counseling," which will help to
"develop[] a legal system that [views and] treats children as
persons."2 5 9 A child needs independent representation
250. Kids' Court School, supra note 249.
251. Traum, supra note 248, at 41; Kids' Court School, supra note 249.
252. Traum, supra note 248, at 41.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Thoman, supra note 248, at 247-48; Kids'Court School, supra note 249.
256. Kids' Court School, supra note 249.
257. Thoman, supra note 248, at 247.
258. Id.
259. Goodmark, supra note 242, at 317.
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because "[a]ppointing a representative for the child increases
the likelihood that the child's needs, wants and rights are the
central focus of the litigation" and ensures that the child has
a voice in the proceedings. 2 6 0 There are two models for legal
representation-there is a debate surrounding which one is
better suited for children: the traditional attorney/client
relationship model, where attorneys advocate for children's
expressed positions, regardless of what they think about
children's choices, and the guardian ad litem ("GAL") model,
where attorneys advocate for children's best interests rather
than children's expressed desires. 261 The GAL model could
potentially disempower children, as children are heard only
if their views are consistent with their GAL's views; children
may be further disillusioned if they believe their attorneys
were appointed to express their views, but find that the GALs
"failed to zealously advocate" for their positions.2 62 But the
traditional attorney/client model may give children "a real
voice in the proceedings"-their attorneys would advise the
children about the consequences of their choices, but children
would hold "ultimate decision-making authority," and the
children's "power in relation to other parties" in the
proceeding would be "equalized." 263 Regardless of the model,
child witnesses need independent legal representation to
"enhance their testimonial experience" and "courts should
appoint independent counsel" rather than "automatically
defer[ring] to prosecutors' discretion." 264
260. Id. at 320-21.
261. Id. at 323.
262. Id. at 328-29.
263. Id. at 324-25. Goodmark also considers the numerous problems associated
with a traditional attorney/client model for children. See id. at 325-26.
Furthermore, Goodmark discusses a number of model programs for providing
representation for children, such as law school clinics and pro bono projects. See
id. at 330-34.
264. Tanya Asim Cooper, Sacrificing the Child to Convict the Defendant:
Secondary Traumatization of Child Witnesses by Prosecutors, Their Inherent
Conflict of Interest, and the Need for Child Witness Counsel, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 239, 286 (2011) (moving toward a child-centered approach by
advocating the need for independent legal counsel for child witnesses to ensure
their rights); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Enhancing the Legal Profession's Response
to Victims of Child Abuse, 24 CRIM. JUST. 12, 12 (2009) [hereinafter Raeder,
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An additional approach could be to appoint "specialized
child advocates" to help child victims and witnesses "cope
with the trial process" and prepare them to testify.2 65 These
specialized child advocates would have the training and
credentials to provide adequate support to children and
follow them through to the outcome of their cases. Specialized
courts could also be provided for child victims and
witnesses.2 66
2. Integrative approaches
Taking the creative approaches of kids' courts,
independent legal counsel, and specialized child advocates a
step further, why not integrate some of these approaches in
the court system directly? There could exist a focal point in
the court system for child witnesses and child victims that
would show children that the court system is not separate
from these efforts to educate and empower them. For
example, in lieu of sending child witnesses and victims to
kids' courts in law schools, why not institute a program in
which the law clinics come to the courts and educate children
there? A courtroom could be designated for children's
education and preparation for testifying in court. That way,
children would actually be immersed in the court building
from the beginning stages of their cases in a manner that is
Enhancing Response to Victims] (noting that the ABA adopted policies from the
Criminal Justice Section, including resolutions that urged support of legislation
so that "child victims of criminal conduct have independent attorneys who can
assist them in obtaining applicable victims' rights").
265. See Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual
Abuse: Why Stereotypes Don't Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16
WIDENER L. REV. 239, 276 (2010) [hereinafter Raeder, Distrusting Young
Children] (suggesting this approach for assisting children and their families in
child abuse cases, as victim advocates are now common in domestic violence
cases); see also Raeder, Enhancing Response to Victims, supra note 264, at 13. I
am utilizing this idea not just for child abuse cases but more generally for child
witnesses and victims who will testify.
266. See Raeder, Distrusting Young Children, supra note 265, at 277-78
(positing that "specialized child abuse courts" could be created "in urban locations,
similar to domestic violence courts that have helped to increase successful
prosecutions and assist victims"). I am again expanding this idea from child abuse
courts to courts for children who are testifying generally.
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positive, inviting, and informative. Specialized child
advocates, along with other support staff, such as mental
health workers, could be appointed and work with the
children throughout all stages of the pre-trial, trial, and post-
trial process-or whatever proceeding in which they are
involved. This integrative approach, in placing children's
rights work directly inside the court system, would certainly
follow the values of the CRC and push for a children's right
to agency in the courtroom.
Alongside these more individualized approaches to
working the CRC into the court system are efforts to
incorporate the CRC through a strategic, systematic process.
Working around the United States's lack of ratification of the
CRC at the federal level, locally there are some legislative
strategies taking place, including a bottom-up incorporation
strategy.2 67 This strategy begins at the grassroots level and
incorporates upwards; for example, "domestically popular
human rights treaties" have been ratified by local and state
governments through lobbying efforts that have focused on
"direct localized incorporation," as opposed to federal
incorporation.2 68 With the CRC as a paradigmatic example,
"governmental bodies in scores of U.S. states, territories,
cities, and localities have adopted resolutions or instruments
endorsing the conventions or adopting them on behalf of their
jurisdictions."269 Sometimes these initiatives are
complemented by "innovative community-based supervision
and other follow-up procedures to monitor local level progress
in achieving treaty-related commitments and to ensure
implementation of locally relevant solutions to the problems
identified." 27 0 A second tactic is for domestic courts to apply
human rights treaty law like the CRC indirectly and use it
267. Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 389, 392, 427-28 (2009) (focusing
on the potential for a shift from "partial subsidiarity (paradox) to genuine
subsidiarity of U.S. human rights policy"-a U.S. policy that is directed not just
outward toward international audiences, but also inward, critical of U.S. domestic
constituencies).
268. Id. at 427-28.




as a "nonbinding interpretive aid or source of persuasive
authority in discerning meaning under independent private
causes of action." 27 1
Therefore, although the CRC has not been ratified by the
United States, its principles can be implemented at the
domestic, grassroots level by state and local governments and
by legal advocates as an indirect, secondary source for
arguments; the latter may be achieved through utilization of
the human rights/children's rights framework to fill in gaps
and bolster legal arguments in the courtroom. These creative
responses, along with the others mentioned above, such as
kids' courts, independent legal counsel, specialized child
advocates, and specialized courts, could all be used in a
sincere effort to empower child victims and witnesses in the
courtroom.
CONCLUSION:
USING INNOVATIVE MODELS TO
EMPOWER CHILDREN IN THE COURTROOM
Mia, the sixteen-year-old who was traumatized from
testifying in a quasi-public forum, could have had quite a
different ending to her story. If international children's
rights frameworks were better employed in the United States
to embolden children who testify in court, she could have
been empowered rather than suppressed. Perhaps she could
have been prepared at a kids' court, could have voiced her
concerns to a Children's Rights Ombudsman, or even been
appointed a specialized child advocate who would have
assisted her in coping with her trauma. The myriad of
creative tactics to empower children in the courtroom should
be utilized more widely. Rather than responding to children's
time in the courtroom retroactively, a more proactive
approach would enhance their experiences in the American
justice system and provide them with the tools to give them
a full sense of agency. A dissemination of knowledge is also
key, as children are not currently well-equipped to face the
adversarial system that works in many ways against them.
In following the relevant provisions of the CRC, the federal
271. Id. at 429.
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or domestic arena could have enabled Mia to have a voice in
those proceedings that deeply affected her.
Particularly with the shift in Confrontation Clause cases
that implicate an increase in child witness testimony, as well
as growing awareness and actions around child abuse, it is
more imperative than ever to ensure that child witnesses'
rights are enforced. While the current tendency in the United
States to "shield" children and protect them from defendants
may affect some child witnesses positively, the concern with
that methodology is that some children may not have a
chance to voice their opinions on cases in which they are
entrenched. Those children will have to live with the
outcomes of those cases, and their level of involvement in
them, for the rest of their lives. How then do they not have a
valid right, some allotment, to their agency in those
proceedings? While some opponents may shy away from or
argue against this right for reasons like conflicting parental
rights and children's lack of cognizance and responsibility, I
have demonstrated that, through international law, children
have a claim upon this right, and their increased
participation will actually enhance their testimony, improve
their legal experiences, and provide them with the means to
grow as persons.
With the CRC at hand, both international and domestic
NGOs and other grassroots efforts have proliferated in
developing the rights of children. By utilizing its provisions,
particularly Articles 12 and 42, a children's right to agency
in the courtroom can be better supported and advanced. Most
importantly, entities can critically examine their practices
surrounding child witnesses and work toward genuine
improvement of those practices.
With the increased prevalence of child witnesses and
victims entrenched in the legal arena, a more comprehensive,
innovative approach is required to meet their needs. If the
United States pays greater attention to inventive domestic
tactics, looks outward to international methods, and then
actually implements those approaches, the United States will
garner a much better international reputation than it has
currently. Through the creation of a Children's Rights
Ombudsman, a focal point for the country, and then the
incorporation of an array of coordination mechanisms to
658 [Vol. 64
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ensure integration of child witness rights into public policy,
those rights can actually balance against the rights of the
accused. People in the United States could then take the
rights of children seriously. Children would gain a better
understanding of legal proceedings and project their voices so
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